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Metamemory can be defined as the knowledge about one's memory capabilities and
about strategies that can aid memory. In this paper, we describe the development and
validation of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS), tailored specifically for use in
face memory and eyewitness identification settings. Participants (N = 800) completed
the EMS and other measures on general metamemory. Results from exploratory and
confirmatory factor analysis revealed good factorial validity, internal consistency, and
content validity. The EMS items emerged into three distinct factors: memory content-
ment, memory discontentment, and memory strategies. The EMS is a brief and easily
administrable questionnaire that might be used to assess self‐ratings of face recogni-
tion capacity and use of strategies to encode faces.
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Metamemory can be defined as the knowledge about one's memory
capabilities and strategies that can aid memory (Shimamura, 2008).
This construct has been the subject of a substantial amount of
research, sparked by developmental studies investigating how the abil-
ity to evaluate one's memory processes and mnemonic strategies
improved learning during early childhood (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter,
1982). Metamemory research has since expanded to a variety of
domains such as cognitive neuropsychology, educational psychology,
and cognitive psychology, motivating the development of diverse
self‐report measures on memory monitoring and control (Pannu &
Kaszniak, 2005). However, current psychometric instruments for
assessment of metamemory typically focus on broad memory domains
(e.g., episodic memory or semantic memory), and there appears to be- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Creative Commons Attribution Li
y Published by John Wiley & Sonsan absence of self‐assessment instruments of memory capacity for
faces and person recognition. In this paper, we present the develop-
ment and initial validation evidence for a metamemory assessment
scale tailored specifically to face memory and eyewitness identifica-
tion settings.
Metamemory research is essential for a comprehensive under-
standing of how people use and perceive their own memory, providing
a theoretical framework that can generate testable hypotheses. For
example, in research examining feeling‐of‐knowing judgements, par-
ticipants decide whether they have studied some new information
sufficiently for future recall. If the subjective memory confidence
experienced indicates they have not sufficiently learned the material,
they may employ mnemonic strategies or engage in further study to
better learn the material (Koriat, 1993). Other important branches of
metamemory research include investigations on the relationship- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
cense, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided
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(Kelemen, 2000), use of memory strategies (Guerrero Sastoque et al.,
2019), regulation of retrieval (Goldsmith, Pansky, & Koriat, 2014),
and how metamemory changes across the lifespan (Ghetti, Lyons,
Lazzarin, & Cornoldi, 2008).
Interest in assessing different aspects of metamemory has stimu-
lated the development of various self‐report measures that differ in
content and item format. The content may include different aspects
of metamemory so that respondents are asked to indicate the fre-
quency of forgetting, the vividness of remembering, contentment with
one's memory, and perceived changes or decay in their capabilities.
The item format can also vary so that some instruments focus on
the relative frequency of memory issues in relation to others or in rela-
tion to one's own performance across a specified period. For example,
the Metamemory in Adulthood Questionnaire (Dixon, Hultsch, & Hert-
zog, 1988) assesses individual's knowledge of general memory pro-
cesses and tasks, frequency of memory strategy use, self‐rated
memory ability, perceptions of memory stability over time, anxiety
regarding memory, memory and achievement motivation, and locus
of control in memory abilities. The Multifactorial Memory Question-
naire (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002) was developed to assess separate
dimensions of memory ratings that are applicable to clinical assess-
ment and intervention. This instrument includes scales of contentment
regarding one's memory, self‐appraisal of one's memory capabilities,
and reported frequency of memory strategy use. Another example is
the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; van Bergen,
Brands, & Jelicic, 2010; Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979), assessing
how one's memory trust has developed over time.
Despite the existence of several self‐report memory question-
naires, there seems to be an absence of instruments that focus specif-
ically on self‐rated memory capacity for faces and person recognition.
Most of the current measures have a strong focus on clinical assess-
ments or interventions and typically include items concerning self‐
evaluation of general memory ability or items concerning semantic
or episodic memory issues. One notable exception is the newly devel-
oped Stirling Face Recognition Scale (SFRS; Bobak, Mileva, &
Hancock, 2019). The SFRS was developed to assess face recognition
ability, ranging from developmental prosopagnosia (i.e., a neurological
disorder characterized by the inability to recognize faces) to
superrecognition. It has two components, face processing and face
memory, which correlated moderately with objective face matching
tests (correlations between r = .28 and r = .34). However, this instru-
ment has not yet been subjected to factor analysis, and the reliability
of each SFRS component is unknown. Furthermore, The SFRS does
not include items related to other person identification elements that
may be relevant in eyewitness settings.
Self‐report instruments specifically developed to measure face rec-
ognition ability and person identification would have important impli-
cations for research and practice. One important issue in the criminal
justice system, for instance, is to distinguish accurate from inaccurate
eyewitness identifications. Evidence obtained from witnesses of
crimes can be very influential in court decisions, but inaccurate wit-
ness identifications can impair investigations and in more severe casescontribute to miscarriages of justice. Some postdictors of eyewitness
identification accuracy have been identified, such as early statements
of confidence (Brewer & Wells, 2006), decision time (Sporer, 1993),
and decision process (i.e., absolute vs. relative judgements, Dunning
& Stern, 1994). However, under certain circumstances, the predictive
value of those factors is undermined, for example, when eyewitnesses
are exposed to biased lineups (Charman, Wells, & Joy, 2011) or
receive feedback after an identification is made (Semmler, Brewer, &
Wells, 2004). This limitation highlights the importance of investigating
new factors that may be used to estimate eyewitness accuracy that
are less undermined by external factors. One such potential estimator
is self‐efficacy in face recognition, which has shown to be predictive
of eyewitness accuracy performance (Olsson & Juslin, 1999; Perfect,
2004). However, previous studies on this issue have used single items
of unknown reliability and validity, limiting conclusions regarding the
relation between self‐efficacy and objective memory performance. A
reliable and valid metamemory scale tailored specifically to eyewitness
settings would improve the inferences in studies investigating the rela-
tion between self‐ratings of memory ability and objective memory
accuracy.
Another important theoretical implication of an eyewitness
metamemory scale is that it would help elucidate the relation between
self‐ratings of memory ability and expressions of confidence. Koriat
(1993) has proposed that expressions of memory confidence are
partly based on the encoding experience (i.e., characteristics of the
stimuli) and on internal cues or beliefs about memory capacity (i.e.,
“am I good at recognizing this type of stimuli?”). However, general the-
ories of memory confidence have not yet been thoroughly examined
in eyewitness contexts. In forensic settings, for example, eyewitness
confidence judgements are commonly used for assessing the likeli-
hood that the eyewitness memory is accurate (Wixted & Wells,
2017). The ability to accurately evaluate one's own memory perfor-
mance is a critical feature of metamemory function, but laboratory
manipulations have shown that eyewitness confidence can be inflated
by factors such as postidentification feedback (Douglass & Steblay,
2006) and repeated recall (Odinot & Wolters, 2006). It has been sug-
gested that confidence expressed by witnesses is also influenced by
internal cues (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014), but the extent to which
memory accuracy and confidence for faces is related to self‐perceived
recognition skill is relatively unknown. In one of the few studies on the
matter, Olsson and Juslin (1999) found that people who claim to be
good face recognizers show slightly higher accuracy and better
confidence‐accuracy calibration in eyewitness identifications, but that
study is limited by the use of single items of unknown reliability and
validity. The absence of valid measures of eyewitness face recognition
ability impairs the advancement of this theoretical line of research.
With such a measure, it would be possible to better examine the rela-
tion between beliefs of memory capacity and expressions of confi-
dence in forensic relevant contexts.
Despite the benefits of self‐report tools, it can be argued that
memory accuracy could be better estimated by objective tests of
memory performance. In fact, it has been proposed that tests of face
recognition performance are informative estimators of proclivity to
966 SARAIVA ET AL.choose and identification accuracy (Baldassari, Kantner, & Lindsay,
2019; Russ, Sauerland, Lee, & Bindemann, 2018). However, in practi-
cal terms, objective tests of face recognition are more difficult to
implement in applied and research settings. That is because commonly
used tests of face recognition or face match ability are computerized
and include many repeated trials (e.g., Dowsett & Burton, 2015;
Russell, Duchaine, & Nakayama, 2009). Ideally, both objective memory
tests and self‐ratings of memory performance could be deployed to
estimate eyewitness identification accuracy, but such approach may
not always be possible due to time and resources constraints. In this
scenario, brief self‐ratings of memory ability may be a feasible alterna-
tive to provide estimates of accuracy in practical settings and in empir-
ical studies, although the relation between eyewitness self‐ratings of
memory capacity and objective performance has yet to be elucidated
(Olsson & Juslin, 1999).
In sum, a metamemory instrument tailored specifically to eyewit-
ness settings would be of considerable value in several lines of
research and has the potential to aid end‐users in forensic contexts.
Obtaining valid measures of metamemory for eyewitness identifica-
tion is essential in research investigating the relation between
self‐efficacy, objective accuracy, and expressions of confidence.
Depending on the results and development of this line of research,
self‐ratings of memory ability may also be employed to distinguish
accurate from inaccurate identifications or to identify individuals with
superior face recognition abilities (Russell et al., 2009). In this article,
we present the development steps and initial evidence of the psycho-
metric validity of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS), a
self‐report memory instrument tailored specifically to face recognition
and eyewitness identification settings. For the purposes of this study,
we aimed to develop the instrument and test its factorial structure,
while also testing for its convergent and discriminant validity through
associations with other metamemory measures.1Participants then took part in an eyewitness paradigm consisting of a mock crime video and
two identification tasks with confidence judgements. These data were obtained as part of a
larger research project aiming to investigate the relation between metamemory measures
and eyewitness memory performance. Due to space and focus, we only report on those mea-
sures that are relevant to the development of the EMS.2 | MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 | Participants and procedure
A total of 1,347 participants proceeded past the informed consent
page, although 143 cases were removed for failure to complete the
metamemory measures. Several exclusion criteria were adopted to
ensure the quality of the data: (a) 38 cases were removed for taking
more than 90 min to complete the experiment (without outliers, the
study took in average 30 min to be completed); (b) 145 cases were
removed for completing the experiment in under 15 min (i.e., an
impossible time to attentively complete the study); (c) 78 cases were
removed for not passing all of the attention checks; and (d) 137 cases
were removed due to suspicious bot activity (i.e., Prims & Motyl,
2018). The final sample (N = 800) comprised 62% female participants
and had a mean age of M = 29.83, ranging from 18 to 72 years (SD =
11.89). The sample was from Amazon Mechanical Turk (48%),
university students attending U.K. and Dutch institutions (32%), and
participants recruited through social media (20%). Participantsrecruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk received U$0.50, students
received course credits, and participants recruited via social media
were entered a prize draw for the prize of two £50 Amazon
vouchers.
In an online survey presented via Qualtrics, participants first com-
pleted the EMS, followed by other general metamemory scales. The
EMS was always shown first, whereas the other metamemory scales
were presented in a random order.1 Demographic information includ-
ing gender, age, and level of education was also obtained, and on com-
pletion of all tasks, participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation.2.2 | Materials and instruments
2.2.1 | Eyewitness Metamemory Scale
Two qualitative approaches were adopted to develop an initial pool of
items for the EMS. First, we closely examined the items of other
metamemory measures and, where possible, based our item develop-
ment on these items. Then a semistructured interview was conducted
with a group of legal psychologists and graduate students working in
this field of research (N = 14) to obtain additional information regard-
ing memory self‐assessment in eyewitness contexts. The initial pool of
items consisted of 35 items, including eyewitness specific items and
items concerning facial recognition adapted from various metamemory
questionnaires. All items were rated on a 7‐point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We did not establish
specific hypotheses concerning the factorial structure that would
emerge from these items but rather used an exploratory approach to
establish its factorial structure.2.2.2 | General metamemory instruments
In addition to the EMS, participants also completed the MMQ
(Troyer & Rich, 2002) and the SSMQ (van Bergen, Horselenberg,
Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Beckers, 2010; Squire et al., 1979). The
MMQ has three subscales: contentment, ability, and strategy. All
items are measured on a 5‐point Likert scale. The contentment scale
has 18 items (e.g., “I am generally pleased with my memory ability”;
α = .92) rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), with
higher scores indicating higher memory contentment. The ability
scale has 20 items related to experiences with common memory
errors over the past 2 weeks (e.g., “how often do you forget an
appointment?”; α = .92) from 1 (all the time) to 5 (never), with higher
scores indicating better self‐reported ability. The strategy scale has
19 items concerning the use of memory strategies during the past
2 weeks (e.g., “how often do you use a timer or alarm to remind
you when to do something?”; α = .88). The items are assessed on a
SARAIVA ET AL. 967scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time), with higher scores indi-
cating greater use of memory strategies. The MMQ has shown good
high test–retest reliability and high internal consistency in the origi-
nal study by Troyer and Rich (2002) and in adaptations to different
countries (e.g., Fort, Adoul, Holl, Kaddour, & Gana, 2004; van der
Werf & Vos, 2011). The SSMQ consists of 18 items related to
memory trust (e.g., “my ability to recall things when I really try is”;
α = .94). Participants rated the items on a 9‐point scale ranging from
−4 (worse than ever) to 4 (better than ever before). This instrument has
shown good psychometric properties in different studies and has
been correlated in a meaningful way with age, cognitive failures,
and susceptibility to misinformation (van Bergen, Brands, et al.,
2010; van Bergen, Horselenberg, et al., 2010). The MMQ and SSMQ
differ mainly in response format. Although both instruments tap into
self‐rated memory ability, the MMQ focuses on present ability (i.e., “I
am generally pleased with my memory ability”), whereas the SSMQ
focuses on memory development over time (“my memory ability is
better than ever before”). Those instruments were selected to test
convergent and divergent validity of the EMS due to their good psy-
chometric properties and high content validity in assessing
metamemory traits such as self‐ratings of memory capacity and
memory trust. However, no specific hypotheses were established a
priori concerning the specific relation between each of the SSMQ
and MMQ factors with the factors obtained for the EMS, given that
the factorial structure of the EMS was unknown prior to our analysis.
Therefore, the convergent and divergent analysis in this study were
exploratory, and it was generally expected that factors in the EMS
would relate meaningfully with factors from the MMQ and SSMQ
given the similarities between those instruments in assessing
metamemory.2.2.3 | Attention checks
Three attention checks were included within the metamemory assess-
ment, in which participants were asked to select a specific response
for that item such as “for this question, please select the option 4 (bet-
ter than ever before).” The attention checks were included as an exclu-
sion criterion (see Section 2.1).3 | RESULTS
To examine the validity of the EMS factorial solutions, a within‐sample
replication strategy was adopted, and the total sample was randomly
split in half (Osborne & Fitzpatrick, 2012). The first half was treated
as a training dataset for obtaining an initial factorial solution via
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). The second half was treated as a test
dataset for examining the fit of the initial solutions obtained in the
training dataset via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). All analyses
were performed in the statistical software package R (2019). The
dataset and data analysis script can be found in Data S1 to S3.3.1 | Exploratory factor analysis
Prior to the analysis, one itemwas removed because of a semantic error
in the survey. A correlation matrix of the remaining 34 items was
screened to identify items that were poorly correlated with the others,
or items that were highly correlated and generating multicollinearity
issues. Eight items were excluded for showing weak item‐total correla-
tions (r < .30). Two other itemswere excluded for presenting high corre-
lations (r > .65) and redundant content in relation to other items.
Diagnostic tests were performed on the remaining 24 items to
examine the assumptions for EFA. Data gathering for the metamemory
measureswere performed in an online settingwith forced responses, so
nomissing responses were present. Graphical inspection and significant
Shapiro Wilk tests for all the items indicated significant univariate
nonnormality, with skewness ranging from −0.87 to +0.89 and kurtosis
ranging from −1.01 to +0.32. This observation was supported by the
statistically significant Mardia's test, indicating that the assumption of
multivariate normality was violated. Therefore, a weighted least squares
extraction method for EFA was used, which provides standard errors
and tests of model fit that are robust to the nonnormality of the data.
The items showed good factorability (Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin test = 0.89
and significant Bartlett's test) and did not present multicollinearity or
singularity issues (determinant >0.00001).
Parallel analysis and scree plots were used as factor retention
criteria and suggested the presence of four factors. A four‐factor solu-
tion was extracted using oblimin rotation to allow for correlations
between the factors. This solution revealed four distinguishable fac-
tors, but one factor had only four emerging items that appeared to
be related to memory development over time. These items presented
high cross‐loadings with two of the other factors in the solution, indi-
cating that a four‐factor solution might not be robust. We proceeded
with the extraction of a three‐factor solution using oblimin rotation.
Examining the pattern matrix, we decided to exclude one item from
the first factor for high cross‐loadings and a content that was disso-
nant with the other items (i.e., “People are generally good at remem-
bering unfamiliar faces”). The same three‐factor extraction was then
repeated on the remaining 23 items (the pattern matrix for this solu-
tion is presented in Table 1). Items had high loadings on their respec-
tive factor, with no cross loadings higher than.30. We termed the
three factors memory contentment (10 items explaining 19% of the
total scale variance), memory discontentment (eight items explaining
15% of the variance), and memory strategies (five items explaining
10% of the variance). The memory contentment factor combined
items related to positive self‐perception of memory ability, including
keywords such as “satisfied,” “confident,” and “better.” The memory
discontentment factor combined items related to negative self‐
perception of memory ability, including keywords such as “trouble”
and “worse.” The memory strategies factor combined items related
to the use of memory strategies in the context of person identification
and could be defined as the extent to which an individual adopts strat-
egies to better recognize someone in the future. Reliability of the fac-
tors was examined using omega coefficients instead of alpha, given
that assumptions for alpha are rarely met in psychometric research
TABLE 1 Item‐total correlations, communalities and pattern matrix for the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale
Scale items ITC h2
Factor loadings
1 2 3
Items Relating to Memory Contentment
1. My ability to remember faces is much better than other people's ability to remember faces. .33 .67 .84 — —
2. I am confident with my ability to remember faces in a stressful situation. .43 .57 .74 — —
3. Compared to other people, I think I would be a much better eyewitness. .40 .60 .73 — —
4. If I saw someone commit a crime, I am certain that I would remember his/her face. .45 .55 .70 — —
5. If I witnessed a robbery, I would be able to recognize the perpetrator a month later. .54 .46 .65 — —
6. As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting better. .58 .42 .65 — —
7. I am generally satisfied with my ability to remember the faces of people I have only met once. .50 .50 .61 −.24 —
8. My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a particular face has improved over time. .62 .38 .57 — —
9. I can give a detailed description of a friend's face to a stranger. .74 .26 .37 −.10 .20
10. I recognize relatively unknown actors, if I have seen them in another movie/television show. .80 .20 .34 −.16 .11
Items Relating to Memory Discontentment
11. Sometimes I have trouble recognizing a person that I know relatively well. .44 .56 .26 .77 −.11
12. My ability to remember faces is much worse than other people's ability to remember faces. .35 .65 −.19 .75 —
13. It often happens that a person who seems familiar starts a conversation with me, but I have no idea
who the person is.
.54 .46 .11 .68 —
14. Whenever I meet an important person, I am worried that I will not be able to recognize him/her a
week later.
.53 .47 — .67 —
15. Compared to other people, I think I would be a much worse eyewitness. .49 .51 −.25 .62 —
16. My ability to correctly remember where and when I saw a particular face has deteriorated over time. .62 .38 −.10 .57 .12
17. When I see a person that looks familiar, I often do not know where I have seen that person before. .66 .34 −.11 .55 —
18. As I age, I find my ability to remember faces is getting worse. .65 .35 −.12 .54 —
Items Relating to Memory Strategies —
19. Compared to other people, I more often use a strategy (e.g., focus on specific facial features such
as eyes) to remember a person's face.
.32 .68 — — .76
20. Compared to ten years ago, I more often use a strategy (e.g., focus on specific facial features such
as eyes) to remember a person's face.
.36 .64 — .14 .75
21. In order to remember a perpetrator's face, I would definitely use a strategy (e.g., focus on specific
facial features such as eyes) to remember the perpetrator's face.
.56 .44 — −.10 .70
22. I often focus on specific facial features such as nose and eyes when I am paying attention to a face
that I have to remember.
.53 .47 — −.10 .67
23. I often create a visual image in my mind of a face that I want to remember. .73 .27 .18 .41
Eigenvalues 4.36 3.55 2.41
Percentage of variance explained .19 .15 .10
Note. Factor loadings higher than >.40 are presented in bold.
Abbreviation: ITC, item‐total correlations.
968 SARAIVA ET AL.(Dunn, Baguley, & Brunsden, 2014). Good reliability scores were found
for the memory contentment (ω = .88, 95% CI [.86, .90]), memory dis-
contentment (ω = .86, 95% CI [.83, .88]), and memory strategies fac-
tors (ω = .82, 95% CI [.78, .85]). A separate factorial structure with
two factors was also extracted for comparison purposes.
3.2 | Confirmatory factor analysis
The purpose of the subsequent analysis was to confirm the factor
structure for the 23‐item EMS on a separate subset of our sample.The results from the EFA indicated that a three‐factor solution was
the most appropriate to describe the EMS. A two‐factor structure
was also submitted for analysis as a plausible competing model for
comparing fit indices. This two‐factor solution was fitted to further
examine whether the contentment and discontentment factors in
the three‐factor solution emerged due to phrasing method rather than
to the constructs the factors represent (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, &
Podsakoff, 2012). Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to
test both models. Goodness of fit was evaluated using the robust root
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) and its 90% confidence
SARAIVA ET AL. 969interval, robust comparative fit index (CFI), robust Tucker–Lewis index
(TLI), and expected cross‐validation index. These fit indices provide
different types of information (i.e., absolute fit, fit adjusting for model
parsimony, and fit relative to a null model), and when combined, they
provide a reliable and conservative evaluation of model fit (Schreiber,
Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006). The chi‐square test is reported,
but not relied upon to evaluate model fit due to its oversensitivity to
sample size and the fact that it tests for perfect fit. The evaluation
of the models was based on (a) conventional criteria for good model
fit (RMSEA < .08, CFI > .90, TLI > .90, smallest expected cross‐
validation index) and (b) the interpretability of the solution (i.e., the
comprehensibility of the factors on a conceptual level).
Diagnostic tests were performed on the 23 items to examine the
assumptions for CFA and indicated that the assumption of multivari-
ate normality was violated. Therefore, we estimated parameters in
CFA using a maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard
errors, which provides tests of model fit that are robust to the
nonnormality of the data (Finney & DiStefano, 2013). Figure 1 pre-
sents the model specification and goodness of fit indices for the
three‐factor model and two‐factor model. The model fit indices sug-
gested that the three‐factor solution had a better fit compared with
the two‐factor solution. However, the three‐factor solution did not
fit the data particularly well (e.g., RMSEA > 0.08, CFI < 0.90, and TLI
< 0.90). In an exploratory approach, we revised the three‐factor model
by evaluating its modification indices, adopting only theoretically
sound modifications to avoid overspecification of the model. Follow-
ing this approach, we included two new correlations between errorsFIGURE 1 Model specification and model fit indices for the three‐factor s
of the Eyewitness Metamemory Scale (EMS). CFI, comparative fit index; EC
root mean square error of approximationof Items 6 and 8 and Items 16 and 18. These modifications were based
on the content of the items, which seem to be closely related to mem-
ory development over time (e.g., “As I age, I find my ability to remem-
ber faces is getting better”). The revised model resulted in an
acceptable fit to data (see Figure 1).3.3 | Convergent and discriminant validity
Convergent and discriminant validity was examined by correlating the
factors of the EMS with factors from other established metamemory
measures (i.e., MMQ and SSMQ). This analysis was conducted on
the complete dataset (N = 800) instead of the training or testing
dataset, given that those subsets were used only to perform indepen-
dent EFA and CFA analyses. The three‐factor solution demonstrated
better validity in both the EFA and CFA, so the three factors emerging
from this solution (i.e., EMS–Contentment, EMS–Discontentment, and
EMS–Strategies) were used in the correlation analyses. Table 2 pre-
sents the correlation matrix of the EMS factors and other
metamemory measures. A small negative correlation was found
between EMS–Contentment and EMS–Discontentment (r = −.29).
A moderate positive correlation was found between the EMS–
Contentment and EMS–Strategies factors (r = .44), but no relation
was found between EMS–Discontentment and EMS–Strategies (r =
.04). The EMS–Contentment and EMS–Discontentment factors pre-
sented a small to moderate relation with most of the other
metamemory measures, whereas the EMS–Strategies factor presentedolution (a), revised three‐factor solution (b), and two‐factor solution (c)
VI, expected cross‐validation index; TLI, Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA,
TABLE 2 Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals of the EMS factors and other metamemory measures
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. EMS–Contentment 4.22 1.02
2. EMS–Discontentment 3.53 1.09 −.29** [−.35, −.23]
3. EMS–Strategies 4.51 1.10 .45** [.39, .50] .04 [−.03, .11]
4. MMQ–Contentment 3.62 0.69 .26** [.19, .32] −.54** [−.59, −.49] .07 [−.00, .14]
5. MMQ–Ability 3.57 0.62 .31** [.24, .37] −.34** [−.40, −.27] .19** [.12, .25] .53** [.48, .58]
6. MMQ–Strategy 2.86 0.64 .09** [.02, .16] .23** [.16, .30] .20** [.13, .26] −.29** [−.36, −.23] −.40** [−.46, −.34]
7. SSMQ 5.91 1.21 .62** [.57, .66] −.20** [−.26, −.13] .38** [.32, .44] .45** [.39, .50] .42** [.36, .47] .07* [.01, .14]
Note. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.
Abbreviation: EMS, Eyewitness Metamemory Scale; MMQ, Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire; SSMQ, Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire.
*p < .05. **p < .01.
970 SARAIVA ET AL.a positive relation with MMQ–Ability, MMQ–Strategy, and SSMQ–
memory trust.4 | DISCUSSION
In this article, we present a new self‐report metamemory question-
naire developed specifically for face recognition and eyewitness iden-
tification settings. Overall, the analyses revealed good evidence of
factorial validity, internal consistency, and both convergent and dis-
criminant validity. EFA yielded three meaningful factors, each of which
is associated with high loadings by the items on one factor but not on
the other. This pattern of loadings provided an initial factorial validity
that was also confirmed in a subset sample, corroborating the instru-
ment division into three scales representing different dimensions of
eyewitness metamemory (i.e., memory contentment, memory discon-
tentment, and memory strategies).
Convergent validity was demonstrated by small to large correla-
tions between the EMS factors and other scales on multidimensional
metamemory questionnaires. EMS–Contentment was positively
related to self‐perceived contentment and ability for general memory
capacity (MMQ) and had a large correlation with memory trust
(SSMQ; r = .62). The EMS–Discontentment factor was negatively
related to self‐perceived contentment and ability for general memory
capacity. Interestingly, some divergent pattern of results can be
observed between EMS–Contentment and EMS–Discontentment.
EMS–Contentment and EMS–Discontentment were not strongly
related, and a model aggregating both factors in a single memory con-
tentment factor presented poor fit to the data in this study. Further-
more, eyewitness memory contentment was positively related to the
use of strategies for person identification (r = .45), but this relation
was not observed for eyewitness memory discontentment (r = .04).
It may be the case that individuals with higher contentment with their
own memories seek additional strategies to maintain performance or
that adopting strategies to better recognize someone result in higher
satisfaction with one's memory capacity (Meinhardt, Persike, &
Meinhardt, 2014). These findings indicate that, at least in part,contentment and discontentment with one's own capacity for face
and person recognition may represent independent constructs, rather
than opposite ends of the same spectrum. The EMS–Strategies factor
had only small to moderate correlations with self‐rated contentment
and ability for general memory capacity and memory trust. This diver-
gent correlation pattern seems related to the fact that EMS–Strategies
items focus specifically on the use of memory strategies to encode
and remember faces, which appears to be somewhat independent
from the use of strategies and self‐appraisal for general memory.
Regarding discriminant validity, part of the nonshared variance
between EMS and the other scales may be due to differences in con-
tent and item format. The EMS focuses specifically on memory for
faces and person identification, whereas the other measures have a
broader scope of items related to different memory domains. Contem-
porary memory models often consider that memory is composed of
relatively independent domains (Repovs & Baddeley, 2006), and there
is some evidence that people have distinct self‐perceived capacity for
different memory domains (Tonković & Vranić, 2011). In terms of item
format, most items in the EMS are responded in relation to present
contentment with memory, whereas in the SSMQ, for example, items
are responded in relation to memory development over time (e.g.,
“better than ever before”). The SSMQ memory development focus
may be especially appropriate in clinical contexts, where changes in
memory perception can indicate the advancement of medical condi-
tions (Mitchell, 2008).
Due to space and focus, we report in the current paper the devel-
opment and evidence for factorial, convergent, and divergent validity
of the EMS. In two other studies, it was observed that some of the
EMS factors are related to eyewitness identification performance
(Saraiva, Van Boeijen, Hope, Sauerland, et al., 2019; Saraiva, Van
Boeijen, Hope, Horselenberg, & Van Koppen, 2019). In Saraiva, Van
Boeijen, Hope, Sauerland, et al. (2019), it was found that lineup
choosers (i.e., witnesses who select someone from a lineup) with
higher EMS–Discontentment were more likely to be inaccurate, in
both biased (OR = 0.57, p < .001) and unbiased lineups (OR = 0.56,
p < .001). In Saraiva, Van Boeijen, Hope, Horselenberg, and Van
Koppen (2019), it was found that for each unit increase in EMS–
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increased by a factor of 1.41 (p < .001), and the odds of making a
false identification decreased by a factor of 0.79 (p = .002). In
both studies, it was also observed that EMS–Contentment and
EMS–discontentment were significant predictors of identification
confidence, suggesting that expressions of confidence are partially
influenced by self‐ratings of face recognition ability. Taken together,
these studies provide initial evidence for the content validity and
predictive validity of the EMS.
The EMS fills an important gap in the literature on face recognition
and eyewitness testimony that might benefit a variety of research sub-
jects. Eyewitnesses in criminal cases, for example, can provide unique
evidence that may help solve investigations, hint to primary suspects,
or potentially identify a perpetrator (Benton, Ross, Bradshaw, Thomas,
& Bradshaw, 2006). However, eyewitness memory is malleable and
susceptible to contamination, which may impair investigations or in
more severe cases contribute to wrongful convictions. Discriminating
accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses is a challenging issue, but some
postdictors of eyewitness identification accuracy have been identified,
such as decision time during identifications (Sauer, Brewer, & Wells,
2008), self‐reported decision‐making process (Sauerland & Sporer,
2007), and early statements of confidence (Wixted & Wells, 2017).
Metamemory judgements and individual differences in face recogni-
tion capacity may also relate to eyewitness performance, but this
hypothesis has been relatively unexplored. Some studies have sug-
gested that people have only moderate insight into their face recogni-
tion and face perception abilities (Bobak et al., 2019), but expressions
of confidence may have a stronger relation to self‐perceived memory
ability. This is of importance because confidence statements are often
used to discriminate accurate from inaccurate witnesses, but little is
known about whether confidence statements are affected by individ-
ual differences (Leippe & Eisenstadt, 2014). Research adopting self‐
report instruments of face recognition capacity such as the EMS could
help clarify the relationship between past experiences with memory
and confidence judgements.
Research on prosopagnosia and superrecognizers could also benefit
from the use of self‐rated measures of face memory capacity. From a
theoretical perspective, it is not clear whether prosopagnosia and supe-
rior face recognition represent opposite ends of the same continuum of
face memory ability (Bobak et al., 2019). Comparing self‐reported
scores of face recognition capacity on patients with prosopagnosia
and super recognizers could help clarify whether objective memory
capacity has a linear relation with subjective memory experience. From
an applied perspective, superrecognizers are considered as particularly
valuable to national security agencies and border control due to their
extraordinary ability to match and recognize faces from video footage
or lineups (Bobak, Dowsett, & Bate, 2016). Valid face memory capacity
self‐report questionnaires could be used as screening tools amongmany
participants prior to other behavioural testing, helping identifying indi-
viduals with remarkable face memory skill.
The EMS is a brief, easily administrable metamemory questionnaire
focusing on face recognition and eyewitness contexts. It has been
developed on a large and relatively heterogeneous sample andshowed good psychometric properties, although future amplification
of its validity is desired. Self‐report assessments of memory add a
unique element to the assessment of memory performance that can-
not be obtained in objective memory testing alone. Self‐report tools
allow the measurement of overarching memory issues and experi-
ences rather than artificial laboratory‐based memory problems, pro-
viding insights on an individual's memory functioning. Consequently,
such tools have an important role in research and theory development
regarding how memory performance relates to one's theory and one's
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